# ISO 27566-3 Revision Checker

> ISO 27566-3 Revision Checker reads the public record of ISO/IEC DIS 27566-3, the published ISO/IEC 27566-1:2025 framework and the public working drafts of the analysis material, and gives a free scope and date check and a paid comparison kit.

Not legal advice; does not certify. Not affiliated with ISO or the IEC. The DIS body is not public and is not stated on this site.

## The record
- Stage: 40.20, DIS ballot initiated 11 September 2026
- Ballot closes: 4 December 2026 (twelve weeks)
- Pages: 60
- Planning date: 14 September 2027, our estimate, not an ISO date
- Official record: https://www.iso.org/standard/88147.html

## Pages
- [Home](/)
- [The record](/publication/)
- [Analysis units](/analysis/)
- [Framework clauses](/framework/)
- [Defined terms](/definitions/)
- [Indicators of effectiveness](/indicators/)
- [Indicators of confidence](/confidence-levels/)
- [Measurement dimensions](/dimensions/)
- [Programme stages](/stages/)
- [Free scope and date check](/scope/)
- [The kit](/kit/)
- [Change watch](/watch/)
- [Prices](/pricing/)
- [Rules by market](/rules/)
- [Answers](/answers/)
- [About](/about/)
- [Method](/methodology/)
- [Sources](/sources/)

## Analysis units
- [P3-01 Name the object you are comparing](/analysis/object-of-comparison/): Before any test, state whether the object is a whole age assurance system, a single component, or a component inside a live system. Give each object a version, a supplier and a date, and keep the boundary fixed for the whole comparison.
- [P3-02 Name the decision the comparison feeds](/analysis/decision-the-comparison-feeds/): Record the decision the result will support, who takes it and when. A procurement shortlist, a regulator's market review, a certification scope and a board paper need different indicators, different samples and different reporting.
- [P3-03 Choose the benchmark basis](/analysis/benchmark-basis/): Decide whether the comparison is against another system, against a published benchmark, against the provider's practice statement, or against all three. Name the basis in the report and keep the same basis for every object.
- [P3-04 State the headline accuracy against an indicator](/analysis/headline-accuracy/): Report a headline statement of classification accuracy, placed against one of the five indicators of confidence, with balanced accuracy as the figure behind it and a description of the component or the component chain that produced it.
- [P3-05 Qualify accuracy with the age buffer](/analysis/age-buffering/): Where the system uses a challenge age above the legal threshold, report the challenge age, the threshold and the error close to each. State the buffering policy, because a headline accuracy without it is not comparable with another system's headline.
- [P3-06 Report continuous measures for an estimated age](/analysis/continuous-measures/): For a system that returns an estimated age, report the error distribution, not only a mean. Show the signs of the errors, the spread, the bias by age band and the cases where the estimate is furthest from the truth.
- [P3-07 Report binary measures at the decision threshold](/analysis/binary-measures/): Where the decision is binary, such as over or under a threshold, report the true positive rate, the true negative rate, the false positive rate, the false negative rate and the class balance. State how a continuous result was converted to a binary one.
- [P3-08 Test equality across groups](/analysis/equality-across-groups/): Test whether the system treats protected groups with equal error, equal outcomes and equal calibration. Report the groups tested, the measures used and the gaps that remain, including groups the sample could not support.
- [P3-09 Select the test methods and the test crew](/analysis/test-methods-and-crew/): Plan the method before the test, use a crew not known to the developer, keep the test under the analyst's control and document the plan in advance. Record the method chosen and why it fits the object.
- [P3-10 Set the sample, the sampling frame and the demographics](/analysis/sampling-and-demographics/): State the sample size, how it was calculated, how the sample was drawn and which age bands, groups, devices and conditions it represents. A sample that cannot support the claimed indicator should not be used to claim it.
- [P3-11 Test presentation attack detection](/analysis/presentation-attack-detection/): Test the presentation attack detection as a security function, then try to defeat it within a stated attack potential. Report the instruments, the acceptance rate for each and whether the result is a functional pass or a vulnerability finding.
- [P3-12 Assess vulnerability and rate the attack](/analysis/vulnerability-and-attack-potential/): List the attack scenarios that apply, rate the attack potential and test only up to the chosen level. Report the level, the scenarios in scope and the scenarios excluded with a reason.
- [P3-13 Quantify uncertainty and repeatability](/analysis/uncertainty-and-repeatability/): Report the uncertainty around every headline figure and show that a repeat run under the same conditions produces a consistent result. Where a second laboratory repeats the test, report reproducibility separately.
- [P3-14 Write the analysis report](/analysis/analysis-report/): Produce a summary for the reader and a detailed report. The summary states the headline accuracy and the indicator. The detailed report carries the object description, the method, the sample, the continuous and binary results, the equality analysis, the attack results and the limitations.
- [P3-15 Publish the claim and the method](/analysis/transparency/): Publish the executive summary of the analysis alongside the age check practice statement. Make the scope, the indicator and the method visible enough for a buyer, a regulator or a member of the public to understand what the claim covers.
- [P3-16 Keep the comparison reproducible](/analysis/reproducible-record/): Keep the test data, the analysis method, the system version and the conditions so that another analyst can repeat the comparison. Record what changed between runs and what it did to the result.
- [P3-17 Set the re-run triggers](/analysis/rerun-triggers/): Set the events that require the comparison to be run again: a new system version, a changed threshold, a new attack pattern, a change in the practice statement, or publication of the final text that this draft becomes.

## Framework clauses
- [4.1 The parts of an age assurance system](/framework/4-1-system-parts/): The framework builds an age assurance system from one or more assurance components plus a processing sub-system. The components produce the age attribute; the sub-system combines, checks and delivers it.
- [4.1.1 Age assurance components](/framework/4-1-1-components/): A component establishes an age attribute from something a person knows, possesses or is, from a trusted attestation, or from a trained assessor's judgement. Systems can combine components to raise trust.
- [4.1.2 Primary and secondary credentials](/framework/4-1-2-credentials/): A primary credential comes from a body with the recognised authority to issue or hold the attribute. A secondary credential is derived from one. Both need checks, and a secondary credential needs extra care for capture error and for the standing of its producer.
- [4.1.3 The processing sub-system](/framework/4-1-3-processing-subsystem/): The processing sub-system gathers components, guards against attacks, handles contra-indicators, combines sources, supports data rights, delivers the attribute, logs its activity and publishes the practice statement.
- [4.2 Guidance for policy makers](/framework/4-2-policy-makers/): A policy maker sets the eligibility rule, the permitted assurance approaches, the criteria providers must meet and the authentication factors expected. It may stay technology neutral or approve and review specific approaches.
- [4.3.1 Age verification](/framework/4-3-1-verification/): Verification computes age from the difference between the current date and a date of birth held in a document or authoritative record. The relying party need not receive the date of birth.
- [4.3.2 Age estimation](/framework/4-3-2-estimation/): Estimation derives age from features or behaviour inherent in the person, often through biometric analysis. The framework points to presentation attack detection and to the measurement of error near the threshold.
- [4.3.3 Age inference](/framework/4-3-3-inference/): Inference derives an age attribute from a credential or fact that implies age, such as a marriage certificate or a parental attestation. The strength of the result depends on the credential and on the rule that links it to the age.
- [4.4 Practice statements](/framework/4-4-practice-statements/): A provider documents the operational practices behind its assured age attributes, and a relying party documents the approaches it accepts. Each party in the chain should know whether its suppliers hold compatible statements.
- [4.5 Age assurance service providers](/framework/4-5-service-providers/): A provider can stand between the person and the relying party, derive the attribute and disclose only the minimum. Where it verifies, it relies on a record issued by a party with authority over the attribute, and checks that the data was not misissued or altered.
- [4.6 Acceptability to the individual](/framework/4-6-acceptability/): A person should be able to form a view on whether a solution meets their privacy and security expectations. Each solution should publicly disclose how it meets the privacy and security objectives.
- [5 The age assurance attribute](/framework/5-age-attribute/): The framework counts age in years as a real number since birth. A relying party can ask for an actual age, an over-age, an under-age or a range. The first three are single values; a range is a pair. An under-age and a range have time-limited validity.
- [6.1 The five indicators of confidence](/framework/6-1-confidence/): The framework sets five core indicators: asserted, basic, standard, enhanced and strict. It does not fix their technical characteristics, and a policy maker can subdivide them for a use case.
- [6.1.1 Asserted age assurance](/framework/6-1-1-asserted/): Asserted assurance is the age a person claims, with no component used to validate it. It is a low indicator of confidence, though the claimed age is not necessarily wrong.
- [6.1.2 Basic age assurance](/framework/6-1-2-basic/): Basic assurance is the first level above an unvalidated claim. The public working draft on benchmarking gives it an external benchmark of at least ninety per cent classification accuracy.
- [6.1.3 Standard age assurance](/framework/6-1-3-standard/): Standard assurance sits in the middle of the scale. The public working draft on benchmarking gives it an external benchmark of at least ninety-nine per cent classification accuracy.
- [6.1.4 Enhanced age assurance](/framework/6-1-4-enhanced/): Enhanced assurance is a high point on the scale. The public working draft on benchmarking gives it an external benchmark of at least ninety-nine point nine per cent classification accuracy.
- [6.1.5 Strict age assurance](/framework/6-1-5-strict/): Strict assurance is the top of the published scale. The public working draft on benchmarking gives it an external benchmark of at least ninety-nine point nine nine per cent classification accuracy.
- [6.2.1 Indicators for verification systems](/framework/6-2-1-verification-indicators/): For a verification system the indicator reflects the authority of the record, the integrity of the document and the binding of the result to the person. The framework does not reduce it to a single accuracy figure.
- [6.2.2 Indicators for estimation systems](/framework/6-2-2-estimation-indicators/): For an estimation system the indicator reflects the measured error, the challenge age, the demographic spread and the resistance to presentation attacks. The framework points to measurement rather than assertion.
- [6.2.3 Indicators for inference systems](/framework/6-2-3-inference-indicators/): For an inference system the indicator reflects the validity of the credential and the strength of the rule that turns it into an age statement. The framework treats the inference as indirect evidence.
- [7.1.1 The date of birth is not disclosed](/framework/7-1-1-date-of-birth/): The system should avoid disclosing a person's date of birth to the relying party. The age attribute can be delivered without the underlying date.
- [7.1.2 Non-disclosure of the age](/framework/7-1-2-age-disclosure/): Where the decision only needs an over-age or under-age result, the system should not disclose the exact age. The eligibility result is enough.
- [7.1.3 Unlinkability](/framework/7-1-3-unlinkability/): The system should prevent an observer from linking two age assurance transactions to the same person when the service does not need to.
- [7.1.4 Untraceability](/framework/7-1-4-untraceability/): The system should not let an observer trace a person's movements or activity through the age assurance service beyond what the service needs.
- [7.1.5 Attributes minimisation](/framework/7-1-5-minimisation/): The system should process only the attributes it needs for the age decision. Extra identity data is a privacy cost with no assurance benefit.
- [7.1.6 User awareness](/framework/7-1-6-user-awareness/): The system should tell the person what is being checked, what is retained and what is disclosed, in language they can understand.
- [7.1.7 Conditional attribute exchange](/framework/7-1-7-conditional-exchange/): The system should release an attribute only when the condition for releasing it is met, rather than releasing it by default.
- [8.1.1 Binding to the correct individual](/framework/8-1-1-binding/): The system should bind the age determination to the person in front of it, so that a correct attribute cannot be used by someone else.
- [8.1.2 Detection of collusion](/framework/8-1-2-collusion/): The system should detect patterns in which people cooperate to defeat the assurance, such as one person supplying a credential for another.
- [8.1.3 Memorisation by a remote site](/framework/8-1-3-memorisation/): The system should limit the ability of a remote site to store and replay an age determination attribute.
- [8.1.4 Freshness of a credential](/framework/8-1-4-freshness/): The system should let the relying party judge whether a credential or result is fresh enough for the decision at hand.
- [8.1.5 Forwarding only where allowed](/framework/8-1-5-forwarding/): The system should allow an age attribute to be forwarded to another provider only where the person or the policy permits it.
- [8.2.1 Biometric presentation attacks](/framework/8-2-1-presentation-attacks/): An estimation system that uses biometrics should resist presentation attacks. The framework points to the ISO/IEC 30107 series for the detection framework and the vocabulary.
- [9.1 Attack and contra-indicator analysis](/framework/9-1-attacks/): The framework treats attacks and contra-indicators as a system concern. The provider should look for evidence that the attribute may be wrong, not only for evidence that it is right.
- [9.2 Attack vectors](/framework/9-2-attack-vectors/): An attack vector is a path by which someone tries to circumvent the process for a malicious outcome. The framework expects the provider to identify the vectors that apply to its design.
- [9.3 Contra-indicators](/framework/9-3-contraindicators/): A contra-indicator is evidence that calls an age attribute into question. It can sit with the person, such as conflicting records, or with the system, such as an attack.

## Prices
- Revision kit: USD 799 one off, PDF, CSV and XLSX.
- Change watch: USD 49 a month.